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CONFESSIONS AND THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL: 
REFLECTIONS ON 
RECENT CHANGES IN 
TURKISH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
* ROBERT K. CALHOUN 
The author delivered these remarks at the 
First International Workshop on Criminal Law Reform 
which was held in Istanbul, Turkey from October 20-24, 1999. 
The conference was sponsored by the Goethe Institute; 
Heinrich-Eoell-Stifling, Germany; 
University of Kansas School of Law; 
Marmara University School of Law; and 
Yeditepe University School of Law 
My topic for today - the law of confessions and the right to access to 
counsel - has been the subject of numerous reform efforts in Turkey 
over the past several years. These reform efforts began with the 1992 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and continued through the 
1997 amendments to the Code and the 1998 Regulations on Police 
Interrogation approved by the Ministers of Justice and the Interior. The 
proposed 1999 Draft of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code builds 
upon these reform efforts, extending them, as I understand it, to all 
criminal cases, including those coming before the State Security Courts. 
As a result of these efforts at reform, to an outsider looking in 
(particularly one from the Unites States) there is much that looks 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate Law School. A.B., Univeristy of Rochester, 1964; J.D., Yale 
Law School, 1970. I am grateful to Professor Feridun Yenisey for his helpful comments. I also 
wish to thank Erin Klingele, Golden Gate Law School class of 2000, for her research assistance. 
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surprisingly familiar about Turkish confessions law. Moreover, when 
such an observer comes - as I do - with a belief that criminal justice 
systems that are founded upon a respect for personal liberty and basic 
human rights are the hallmark of a free and democratic society, the 
current system in Turkey is one that appears worthy of considerable 
commendation. 
However, there are two areas in which I would suggest that further 
reform in Turkey might profitably be considered. 
The first would be to extend the same rights and protections to those who 
are being detained and interrogated in cases before the State Security 
Courts as are enjoyed by individuals currently charged with more basic 
or traditional criminal offenses. As I've already said, I believe proposals 
to achieve just such reform are incorporated in the provisions of the new 
draft code. 
The second area is more problematic. It is one that plagues most 
criminal justice systems, including my own and most of the member 
states of the European Community - that is, the recurrent disparity 
between what is required of the police by way of law and what happens 
in actual practice in the police station in many cases .. I will propose 
some suggested bases for reform here as well. 
Let me start with the need to bring practices in the State Security Courts 
in line with more basic Turkish criminal procedure. 
Suspects charged with basic crimes in Turkey enjoy a privilege not to 
incriminate themselves which translates into a right to insist that any 
statements they make are freely given and not the result of torture, drugs, 
stress, pressure tactics or fraud. 
They enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel immediately upon 
apprehension and the right to appointed counsel if they cannot afford 
counsel. 
In addition, they enjoy the right to certain caution requirements (what we 
in the United States would call Miranda warnings) - that is, formal 
advisement by the police of the suspect's right to silence, counsel and 
appointed counsel. 
Lastly, a suspect charged with common, individual cnmes must be 
brought before a judicial magistrate within 24 hours. 
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By way of contrast, a person apprehended for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the State Security Courts only enjoys the right to counsel 
once he is formally arrested or made subject to a formal order of a judge 
extending the time of detention beyond the four-day period that may be 
authorized by the public prosecution when collective crimes are alleged. 
In short, this means, as I understand it, that those accused of collective 
crimes before the State Security Courts do not have a right to counsel 
during the ftrst four days of their detention. Nor do they have a right to 
appear before a magistrate during this period. Lastly, even when the 
right to counsel does come into play (after the expiration of the four day 
period), if I read the August 21, 1998 Regulation of the Ministries of 
Justice and Interior correctly, the right to appointed counsel for those 
who cannot afford counsel does not apply to crimes falling under the 
scope of the State Security Courts. 
I would like to suggest that these limitations on the procedural rights of 
those charged in State Security Courts are not in keeping with the spirit 
of reform that is at the heart of the rest of the Turkish Penal Code; that 
they are not in keeping with most modem efforts to control excessive 
conduct on the part of police; that they are not required as a legitimate 
need of all states to combat terror; and that by providing a period of 
incommunicado control of the suspect by the police, they increase the 
possibility of torture and other like mistreatment of the accused. 
There is no doubt that terrorism represents a threat to a state's very 
existence and can justify measures that might not be considered in less 
threatening times. It is also true, however, that there is no greater 
measure of a state's commitment to the human liberties of its citizens 
than its protection of those rights during times of strife and discontent. 
Indeed, as the Israeli Supreme Court observed in its recent opinion 
outlawing torture of terrorist suspects, the interrogation practices of the 
police in a given regime are indicative of the regime's very character. 
Most member states of the European Convention on Human Rights do 
not permit such an extended period of incommunicado detention of 
terrorist suspects as is currently permitted in Turkey - even though 
many of these states have faced very grave threats of terrorism. Indeed, 
even a state such as France, which permits holding a terrorist suspect for 
as long as four days before bringing him before a magistrate, still allows 
such a suspect the right to confer with counsel after the first twenty hours 
of policy custody. 
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My own country, which has recently experienced its own unpleasant 
encounters with terrorism (in such well-publicized incidents as the 
Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings), still adheres to a 
rule that requires that a suspect be brought before a magistrate as soon as 
is reasonably possible. The test of reasonableness has been variously 
measured as being as short as six hours and certainly no longer than 48 
hours when the issue is the legality of a warrantless arrest. Moreover, 
the right to counsel adheres immediately upon accusation or the initiation 
of custodial interrogation, no matter what the nature of the charge. 
My mention of the approaches of other countries is not done with the 
intent of suggesting that these other countries have got it right and 
Turkey is wrong. Quite the contrary, I believe that Turkey has developed 
quite an enlightened approach toward issues of police interrogation. I 
merely wish to suggest that this approach be adopted across the full 
spectrum of interrogation contexts - including cases alleging terrorism 
before the State Security Courts. 
I do this against the backdrop of police excesses that Turkey has 
experienced in the past. Torture and other mistreatment of prisoners has 
been a documented problem in the past in Turkish jails. Turkey has 
taken great strides to address this problem and, indeed, the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture acknowledged in a 1997 report 
that Turkey is moving in the right direction with respect to its treatment 
of prisoners. Nonetheless, reports by local bar associations, human 
rights organizations and public officials in Turkey indicate that even 
though Turkey has made significant progress on this front, the 
mistreatment of prisoners remains a problem, particularly during periods 
of pre-trial interrogation. 
It is with this in mind that I question the restrictions on counsel and 
judicial intervention for a four-day period of incommunicado custody of 
the suspect in state security cases. By creating such a substantial period 
of total police control with no possibility of outside intervention, a 
situation is created that can all too easily be abused by those law 
enforcement figures who may be so inclined. 
This is why I read the draft code of criminal procedure as another major 
step in Turkey's efforts to bring progressive reform to its rules of 
criminal procedure. 
As I understand the draft code, it would limit the detention period for 
suspects charged with collective crimes before State Security Courts to 
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48 hours; would make the right to counsel effective immediately upon 
detention; and would extend the right to appointed counsel to such cases. 
This builds upon the reform efforts that have characterized the last 10 
years of Turkish criminal procedure modification and is another 
significant step in Turkey's efforts to ensure the proper treatment of 
suspects in its criminal courts. 
Now let me address the other issue I wish to raise - that is, the disparity 
between what is required by law and what often actually occurs in the 
quiet secrecy of the police station. This is a problem in Turkey, although 
such disparity problems exist in most other countries as well. 
In my own country, such disparity is a significant problem. Despite the 
fact that the right to silence and the right to counsel are part of the 
fundamental guarantees of our Constitution (in what we call "The Bill of 
Rights") and despite the fact that we proudly enforce these rights with an 
exclusionary rule, we are told that American police often fail to honor 
these rules and then, worse, lie - even under oath - to avoid application 
of the exclusionary rule. In fact, it is a frequent enough problem in the 
American criminal justice system that it has spawned its own term -
"testilying" (which is, of course, a combination of two English words -
testifying and lying). In such "swearing contests" between the accused 
and the police as to what happened, judges are more likely to credit the 
version of the police than they are to believe the obviously self-serving 
allegations of the suspect. Recently, in Great Britain a more ominous 
form of this has been brought to light - that is, the actual fabrication by 
police of confessions in at least a couple of notorious terrorist trials (the 
Birmingham Six and the Guilford Four). 
It is against this backdrop of problems in my own country that I observe 
that Turkey appears to experience a very serious discrepancy between 
what the law requires by way of protection of the accused and what the 
police actually provide in the police station. For example, despite the 
guarantees that regularly charged defendants be brought before a court 
within twenty-four hours, and suspects under the jurisdiction of the state 
security courts be brought before a magistrate within four days, it is 
reported that this limit is frequently exceeded. According to a recent 
report of the Istanbul Bar Association, this is achieved in a variety of 
ways, including falsification of the time of apprehension on the 
appropriate forms, obtaining extensions from prosecutors in cases where 
they should not be granted, etc. 
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Again, according to a report of the Istanbul Bar Association, as well as 
reports by organizations such as the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture, even though Article 136 of the Turkish Code of 
Criminal Procedure explicitly guarantees to all suspects the right to 
confer with counsel, this right is often ignored by police. For example, a 
report of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture noted that, as 
recently as 1997, the head of the anti-terror department of the Istanbul 
Police Department had claimed that not a single suspect in his custody 
had ever sought to make use of the right. The 1998 report of the Istanbul 
Bar Association indicated that even when prosecutors have issued 
written orders for contact between the suspect and his attorney, this was 
obstructed under such pretexts as the suspect being taken out for an 
inspection of the place of the crime. 
More significantly, despite the explicit guarantee in Article 135 that 
suspects be informed of their rights, and the more specific requirement of 
the Prime Minister's Circular of December 2, 1997 that this be done in 
writing pursuant to a specific form, the 1998 report of the Istanbul Bar 
Association alleges that this is often not done at all - or if done, done 
long after the suspect has been taken into custody and subjected to 
interrogation. This seems to derive in part from the belief among many 
police that Article 136 does not apply to "preliminary discussions" but 
only to the taking of a formal statement - when, in fact, Article 136 
applies quite specifically from the outset of police custody (at least for 
non-state security cases). 
Lastly, and most problematically, despite the very significant efforts of 
Turkish authorities to change this, the torture of suspects - particularly 
those charged with crimes before the state security courts - remains a 
problem. The Turkish public has periodically been outraged by some of 
the more publicized examples of this, including the cases of Metin 
Goktepe, Gulderen Baran and the fourteen teenage suspects in Manisa. 
In the time remaining to me I would like to make several suggestions 
regarding how Turkey might take steps to bring police behavior into line 
with what is required by Turkish law. Some of the suggestions reflect 
the experience of other countries; others are specific to the Turkish 
situation. 
First of all, I would reiterate my recommendation that Turkey pass the 
proposed draft of the criminal procedure code that would end the lengthy 
incommunicado interrogation of suspects before the State Security 
Courts. If there is concern that police do not always do what is required 
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of them, then it is difficult to justify this level of police control of the 
process. Access to the courts and counsel is a basic means of ensuring 
the legality of the interrogation procedure. 
Second, when there are indications that police may be misinterpreting the 
law (such as when the right to counsel attaches) then the appropriate 
authorities should clarify the law for them in no uncertain terms and 
make clear that they will be held accountable to the law. 
Next, I would recommend that Turkey do what Great Britain has done -
that is, require that all police interrogations be videotaped. I realize this 
presents a resources problem, particularly in smaller, more rural parts of 
the country. I realize also that my own country has talked about doing 
this for years and still does not require videotaping as a general rule. 
Nonetheless, there is probably no greater deterrent to official misconduct 
by the police than the knowledge that their actions are being recorded. 
In addition, I would urge that Turkish prosecutors and Turkish judges 
take more seriously the allegations by defendants of torture and 
mistreatment in individual cases. There is a normal human reaction to 
discount such allegations as self-serving and less than credible when they 
come from someone accused of serious criminality. Thus, it is not 
surprising to learn that the chief judge of the Ankara State Security Court 
was quoted recently as saying that allegations of mistreatment are "the 
standard made-up defense of State Security Court defendants." 
Nonetheless, if we know that mistreatment does occur in general, then 
we must resist the temptation to assume that specific allegations of it 
must always be false. Turkish courts are empowered not only with the 
power to punish individual officers under sections 243 and 245 of the 
Turkish Penal Code but with the relatively new power of excluding 
unlawfully obtained evidence pursuant to sections 135A and 254 of the 
Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure. Although anecdotal evidence 
suggests that courts have utilized this powerful suppression tool in minor 
cases, so far its use in serious cases is less evident. Courts must be 
prepared to enforce these exclusion remedies even when enforcement 
leads to the failure of criminal prosecutions. 
I say this knowing that reluctance to impose the exclusionary remedy can 
be readily found in my own country when the consequences of its 
application might be to undermine the prosecution of a serious case: 
This evasion is achieved sometimes through explicit exceptions to the 
rule and sometimes through questionable findings of fact and law 
regarding the actual conduct of the police. In individual cases where the 
7
Calhoun: Turkish Confessions Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
68 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 6:1 
abstract ideal of fair treatment of the accused is balanced against the 
specific evidentiary needs of a particular criminal prosecution, the 
temptation is frequently to say "not in this case." The accumulated effect 
of many such decisions can be the silent repeal· of the exclusionary 
remedy. Countries such as yours and mine that have concluded the only 
successful way to oversee the actions of law enforcement is through a 
rule of exclusion must have the courage of their convictions. If we are 
not prepared to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence in cases where its 
loss will be felt, then we will never experienced the full deterrent 
potential of such a rule. 
As yet a further recommendation, I would urge that there be greater 
respect in Turkey for the defense function in criminal cases. I know that 
Turkey, like many countries in Europe, has, in recent years, modified the 
inquisitorial roots of its criminal justice system to provide a more 
significant role for defense counsel. Despite this (or perhaps because of 
this) defense attorneys are sometimes viewed with distrust and often with 
disrespect in Turkey. This discourages lawyers from practice in this area 
and marginalizes the practice of criminal law. The defense of accused 
criminals (and particularly accused terrorists) is not itself subversive 
activity. Instead, in a system such as Turkey's, it is a vigorous sign of a 
system's commitment to the rule of law. 
Lastly, I would urge Turkey to reassert prosecutorial control of the 
interrogation practice. In theory, Turkish law authorizes the public 
prosecutor to conduct the investigation in the preparatory stage. In 
reality, particularly in State Security cases, security forces control the 
process. In the past, I know that judicial police have been proposed as 
one way of reasserting prosecutorial control in this area. I am also aware 
that such proposals have failed for a variety of reasons. Whether or not 
this particular proposal is worth reconsidering, at a minimum greater 
monetary resources should be accorded to the prosecutor with the 
explicit purpose of reasserting greater prosecutorial inspection and 
oversight of detention and interrogation facilities. 
This is a pivotal time in Turkey. It is a time of profound sorrow as the 
horrible aftereffects of the recent earthquake are still being measured. It 
is also a time of much ferment and change. Indeed, if there is one 
possible plus to be found in the terrible tragedy of this past summer, it 
seems to be that it has provoked Turks to look at old problems in new 
ways. Such rethinking in the area of criminal justice began, of course, 
long before this summer and has, in fact, been going on for the better part 
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of a decade. Hopefully this conference and, in some modest way, my 
comments, will be of benefit as you continue this process of reform. 
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